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(4) The Louisiana law of default is reconcilable with the
doctrine.
(5) Article 2052, while on its face presenting some objec-
tion to the doctrine, can be reconciled with the doctrine by read-
ing the article in conjunction with Articles 2053 and 1932.
There are, however, certain areas of the Louisiana law which
may well require some modification in the anticipatory breach
doctrine.
(1) Article 2047 of the Code may well overcome the common
law rule that a repudiator may not retract his repudiation after
suit is brought by the repudiatee in reliance on the repudiation.
(2) It is possible that the Louisiana rule as to the calcula-




Following the rendition of a favorable judgment, the plain-
tiff looks next to execution thereon. Often, however, there are
reasons which prevent successful execution at that time. For
example, if the judgment is one for money, immediate execution
may be deterred by reason of the defendant's insolvency. There-
fore, in those legal systems which place a limitation on the life
of a judgment there must be some means provided to extend this
period if execution is not to be barred by the mere lapse of time.
The purpose of this Comment is to compare the procedure per-
mitting extension of the life of a judgment at the common law, in
France, and in Louisiana. Major emphasis is placed on the re-
vival of judgments in Louisiana and the contributions of the pro-
posed Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure in this area.
Revival of Judgments at Common Law
At common law, if execution was not issued upon a judgment
within a year and a day, the judgment became dormant. After
this period it was presumed that the judgment had been satis-
80. For another discussion of the anticipatory breach doctrine in Louisiana
see Comment, Anticipatory Breach in Louisiana, 7 TUL. L. REV. 586 (1933).
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fied and the judgment creditor could not obtain execution with-
out further resort to the courts.1 In personal actions the judg-
ment creditor was obliged to bring an original action of debt if
execution had not been issued timely. 2 In real actions an original
action of debt would not lie.3 However, since any execution
issued on real actions was required to be entered upon the judg-
ment roll, the judgment creditor could resort to the writ of scire
facias to obtain execution if the roll showed that there had been
no prior execution within a year and a day.4 The writ of scire
facias was a summary proceeding in which the judgment debtor
was cited to show cause why execution should not issue on the
dormant judgment." In 1285 scire facias was made available by
statute to revive dormant personal judgments.6 The major ad-
vantage of this summary proceeding was to relieve the judgment
creditor from the tedious and intricate pleadings at common
law.7 Apparently there was no time limit within which a judg-
ment could be revived. 8
The problems presented by the "eternal judgment" with its
accompanying lien upon the debtor's property are self evident.
Certainty of title to real property could never be assured under
such a system. It was also felt that the unlimited life of a judg-
ment placed an onerous and undesirable burden on the judg-
ment debtor." Such considerations prompted early remedial
legislation in the American states.'0 Statutory periods of limita-
tion on execution and revival of judgments have now largely re-
placed or drastically modified the early remedies of scire facias
and action of debt in this country."
1. See 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 421 (1766) ; 2 TIDD'S PRACTICE 1101
et seq. (1840).
2. COKE, SECOND INSTITUTES 469 (1797) ; GILBERT, EXECUTIONS 92 (1763).
3. COKE, SECOND INSTITUTES 469 (1797).
4. 2 TrDD'S PRACTICE 1101 (1840).
5. See note 1 supra.
6. Statute of Westminster I, 1285, 13 EDW. I, c. 45.
7. COKE, SECOND INSTITUTES 469 (1797). Since the statute making the writ
of scire facias available in personal actions was couched in affirmative language,
it did not preclude the common law remedy of an original action of debt on the
judgment. Therefore the remedies were cumulative. Id. at 471.
8. The Statute of Limitations, 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, § 3 (1623), excepted actions
of debt upon a specialty and therefore did not apply to judgments. BALLANTINE,
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 83, 86 (1810).
. 9. See Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American Law - A Hi-
torical Inventory and a Prospectus, 42 IOWA L. REV. 155 (1957).
10. Ibid.
11. Fed. R. Civ. P. 81B abolished the writ of scire facias in federal courts and
substituted an appropriate motion therefor. See Michael v. Smith, 95 App. D.C.
186, 221 F.2d 59 (1955). In Minnesota it is provided that: "No action shall be




There is no specified procedure for the revival of judgments
in France. This is probably due to the process of "substitution
of prescription" which prevails in that country. If a judgment
is definitive the thirty-year prescription under Article 2262 of
the French Civil Code 12 is substituted for the shorter prescrip-
tive period which was applicable before institution of the suit.
13
For example, Article 189 of the French Code of Commerce pro-
vides in part that all actions relative to letters of exchange which
have been underwritten by bankers are prescribed by five years
if there has been no condemnation of the debtor. 4 However, if
a definitive judgment has been rendered thereon, the thirty-year
prescription of Article 2262 of the French Civil Code is substi-
tuted for the shorter prescription of five years provided for by
the Commercial Code.' 5 The thirty-year prescription which is
substituted for a shorter prescription by a definitive judgment
may be interrupted by any of the methods provided for the in-
terruption of any prescriptive period.' According to the French
Civil Code the methods of interrupting prescription are citation,
a writ of demand or attachment served upon the debtor, 17 or his
admission of the debt.'8
Contrasted with present Anglo-American statutes of limita-
tion on judgments, which generally range from five to ten years,
state or territory thereof, unless begun within ten years after the entry of such
judgment." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.04 (1945). In Pennsylvania it is provided
in part that: "The lien of a judgment may be revived by the indexing of (1) a
judgment of revival by agreement between the plaintiff and defendant, or of (2)
a writ of scire facias, if such judgment by agreement is entered of record in or
such writ is issued out of the court in which the original judgment was entered
within five years after the date on which the original judgment or the last pre-
ceding judgment of revival, as the case may be, was indexed." 12 PA. STAT. § 879
(1953). Texas deals with the revival of judgments by providing that: "A judg-
ment in any court of record, where execution has not issued within twelve months
after the rendition of the judgment, may be revived by scire facias or an action
of debt brought thereon within ten years after date of such judgment, and not
after." TEX. ANN. CIV. STAT. art. 5532 (Vernon, 1958).
12. CODE CIVIL art. 2262: "Toutes les actions, tant rdele8 quo peronwUoe,
sont prescrites par trente ans, sans que celui qui alldgue cette prescription soit
obligd d'en rapporter un titre, ou qu'on puisse lui opposer i'emception d6duite de
la mauvaise foi."
13. 2 GLASSON, TRAITI TItIORIQUE ET PRATIQUE 'ORGANISATION JUDICIAIRE,
DE COMPItTENCE ET DE PROCPDURE CIVIL § 560 (3d ed. 1926).
14. DALLOZ, CODE DE COMMERCE art. 189 (1959).
15. 2 GARSONNET ET CtzAR-BRu, TRAIT , THtORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE PRO-
CllDURE CIVIL ET COMMERCIALE § 739 (3d ed. 1913).
16. 2 GLASSON, TRAIT-t THIuORIQUE ET PRATIQUE D'ORGANISATION JUDICIATHE,
DE COMPItTENCE ET DE PROCItDURE CIVIL § 560 (3d ed. 1926) ; MOREL, PrOCtDuRE
CIVIL § 544 (2d ed. 1949).
17. CODE CIVIL art. 2244.
18. Id. art. 2248.
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the French prescriptive period of thirty years appears very
lengthy. At least one reason for the French rule is that a defi-
nitive judgment is the most solemn expression of an existing
obligation. Because of the lengthy prescriptive period, which is
easily interrupted, the French are apparently not faced with any
serious problem of revival of judgments.19
Revival of Judgments in Louisiana
Domestic Judgments. Prior to 1853 there was no prescription
on judgments rendered within the State of Louisiana.20 In that
year the legislature enacted a statute providing that money judg-
ments would prescribe by the lapse of ten years from the date
of rendition..2 1 Provision was made in the act for the revival of
a judgment by any interested party. The effect of revival was
to continue the judgment in force for another ten-year period
from the date of revival. A judgment could be revived any num-
ber of times.2 2
Early decisions interpreting the 1853 act held that revival
proceedings provided the exclusive mode of interrupting pre-
scription on money judgments.2 3 Although these cases were all
decided in the 1870's, the groundwork for dissension from their
pronouncements was laid by the legislature in 1858. An act of
that year provided that parol evidence was incompetent to prove
19. The French do have an interesting procedural rule which may defeat a
plaintiff's action while suit is pending. This is termed pdremption d'inatance and
may well be assimilated to our abandonment of actions. Under the French Code
of Civil Procedure, if there has been no action on an instituted suit for three
years, the suit is extinguished. CODE DE PRCcDURE CIVIL art. 397. This period
is one of peremption and extinguishes the plaintiff's right to pursue the suit. 2
GLASSON, TRAIT TH]ORIQUE ET PRATIQUE D'ORGANISATION JUDICIAIRE, DE COM-
PATENCE ET DE PROCUDURE CIVIL § 560 (3d ed. 1926).
In the case of a default judgment the peremptive period of six months is ap-
plied if there has been no execution. CODE DE PEOCtDURE CIvm art. 156. How-
ever, since there is no perdmption d'inatance until the three-year period has run,
the plaintiff may obtain a new judgment within this time. 2 GLASSON, op. cit.
supra, at § 580.
20. The provisions of Civil Code Article 3547 placing a ten-year prescription
on money judgments had no counterpart in the Codes of 1808 and 1825. Many de-
cisions contain. language sustaining the statement in the text. Cassiere v. Cuban
Coffee Mills, 225 La. 1003, 74 So.2d 193 (1954); Bailey v. Louisiana & N.W.
R.R., 159 La. 575, 105 So. 626 (1925) ; Folger and Son v. Slaughter, 33 La. Ann.
341 (1881) ; Marbury v. Pace, 30 La. Ann. 1330 (1878) ; Succession of Patrick,
30 La. Ann. 1071 (1878) ; McStea v. Rotchford, 29 La. Ann. 69 (1877) ; Succes-
sion of Rice, 15 La. Ann. 649 (1860); Blanchard v. Smith, 45 So.2d 527 (La.
App. 1950).
* 21. La. Acts 1853, No. 274.
22. Id. § 2.
23. Smith v. Palfrey, 28 La. Ann. 615 (1876) ; Succession of Hardy, 25 La.
Ann. 489 (1873.) ; Byrne, Vance and Co. v. Garrett, 23 La. Ann. 587 (1871).
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any acknowledgment of a judgment in order to interrupt pre-
scription thereon. Any such acknowledgment was required to be
in writing and signed by the debtor or his attorney in fact.24
The conflict between this legislation and the rule that revival
proceedings are the exclusive means of interrupting prescrip-
tion on a judgment is apparent. If a written acknowledgment
operates to interrupt prescription on a judgment, it follows that
a suit to revive is not the exclusive means of interrupting pre-
scription. 25
The acts of 1853 and 1858 were amendedl, and incorporated
into the Revised Civil Code of 1870 as Articles 3547 and 2278,
respectively. 27 Shortly thereafter the Louisiana Supreme Court
was afforded the opportunity to deal with the conflict in the two
articles. In Succession of Patrick,28 a money judgment was ren-
dered on January 4, 1868. The plea of prescription was filed in
the succession proceedings on February 16, 1878, more than ten
years after rendition of the judgment. In reply to the plea of
prescription under Article 3547 it was contended that there had
been an acknowledgment within the ten-year period, which com-
plied with the provisions of Article 2278. Without mentioning
prior jurisprudence, which had held revival proceedings under
Article 3547 to be the exclusive means of interrupting prescrip-
tion on a judgment, 29 the court found that the acknowledgment
effectively interrupted prescription. In reaching this conclusion
the court stated that interruption of prescription should not be
confused with preventing prescription under the revival proceed-
ings of Article 3547."0 The court used language indicating that
prescription of the debt evidenced by the judgment could be
interrupted by all the means provided for interrupting prescrip-
24. La. Acts 1858, No. 208, incorporated in LA. R.S. § 2812 (1870).
25. In Smith v. Palfrey, 28 La. Ann. 615 (1876), it was argued that there
had been an acknowledgment within the ten-year period, thus interrupting pre-
scription. The act of 1858 was not mentioned expressly and the court held that a
revival proceeding was the only way to interrupt prescription on a judgment. A
claim of acknowledgment under the provisions of the act of 1858 [later LA. R.S.§ 2812 (1870)] was specifically urged in Succession of Hardy, 25 La. Ann. 489(1873), but the court did not reach the question, finding that no acknowledgment
by the debtor had been made.
26. These amendments are not pertinent to the present discussion.
27. LA. Civit CODE arts. 3547, 2278 (1870).
28. 30 La. Ann. 1071 (1878).
29. See note 23 supra.
30. The court stated: "We may here remark of this peculiar statutory action
that it is not to be confounded with the interruption of prescription, which when
the statute is complied with is not interrupted in the sense and meaning of the
law, but is considered as having never been, as being altogether prevented by the
action for revival." Succession of Patrick, 30 La. Ann. 1071, 1072 (1878).
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tion on ordinary debts, subject only to the parol evidence rule
of Article 2278. 31 Therefore, the Patrick case apparently stood
for the proposition that prescription on the judgment can be
interrupted only by revival proceedings, while the debt as evi-
denced by the judgment can be interrupted by an acknowledg-
ment which complies with the provisions of Article 2278. If this
interpretation of the decision is correct, then it would seem that
the court overlooked the basic principle that a debt is merged in
its judgment. To deal with the debt apart from the judgment is
to indulge in a fiction. Regardless of the true meaning of the
court, subsequent cases interpreted the Patrick case to mean that
revival proceedings under Civil Code Article 3547 were not the
exclusive mode of interrupting prescription on a money judg-
ment.
82
The rule that a suit for revival was not the exclusive mode
of interrupting prescription on a money judgment prevailed
until the case of Bailey v. Louisiana and N.W.R.R. 3 3 was decided
in 1925. As in the Patrick case, the court was presented the
question of whether an acknowledgment by the judgment debtor
would interrupt prescription on the judgment. Although the
court found no acknowledgment and maintained the plea of pre-
scription, some rather puzzling language was used in the course
of the opinion. It was determined that the Patrick decision had
been misinterpreted and that it actually stood for the proposition
that only prescription on the debt, as evidenced by the judgment,
could be interrupted by a written acknowledgment signed by the
debtor. The court stated that although a revival proceeding
under Article 3547 was the exclusive means of interrupting pre-
31. At one point the court stated: "If then, the proceeding under the statute
[referring to Civil Code Article 3547] was intended to revivify and 'continue in
force' ab origine the judgment, and with no other scope or object, how can it be
said to be at all events the only and exclusive means of 'interrupting' the prescrip-
tion of the debt evidenced by the judgment, a subject and matter for which the
law at the time of the passage of the act under discussion made other and distinct
provisions?" (Emphasis added.) Id. at 1074. The court also enumerated the
means of interrupting prescription on ordinary debts contained in the Code and
stated that "by every fair and well established rule of interpretation, being upon a
general subject under general heads, and being, also, general in their terms, they
must have general application to all debts, however evidenced." (Emphasis add-
ed.) Id. at 1076. The court further stated: "We think then, that, subject only to
the exclusion of parol evidence, . . . the prescription of judgments may be inter-
rupted like other debts, or debts evidenced in other form." (Emphasis added.) Ibid.
32. Lelane v. Payne, 42 La. Ann. 152, 7 So. 481 (1890) ; Norres v. Hayes, 42
La. Ann. 857, 8 So. 606 (1890); Levy v. Calhoun, 34 La. Ann. 413 (1882);
Calhoun v. Levy, 33 La. Ann. 1296 (1881) ; Keller v. Keller, 4 Orl. App. 309
(La. App. 1907).
33. 159 La. 576, 105 So. 626 (1925).
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scription on the judgment, the judgment creditor might yet :sue
on the debt, as evidenced by the acknowledgment or promise to
pay. As pointed out in connection with the Patrick case, it is
unrealistic to deal with a debt apart from the judgment. In view
of the numerous Louisiana decisions declaring that a debt is
merged with the judgment, 34 it is submitted that the accuracy of
the language used in the Bailey case is questionable in this re-
spect.35
Although the Bailey case was cited with approval in later
cases holding that revival proceedings under Article 3547 are
the exclusive means of interrupting prescription on a money
judgment36 it was not until 1954 that this area was completely
cleared of confusion. In that year, the decision of Cassiere v.
Cuban Coffee Mills3 7 removed any doubts as to the proper inter-
pretation of Articles 3547 and 2278. Once again the court was
squarely tendered the problem of whether an acknowledgment
would interrupt prescription on a money judgment. Approval
was given that part of the Bailey decision holding that a revival
proceeding under Article 3547 provides the only means of inter-
rupting prescription of a money judgment. However, the court
disapproved the language in the Bailey case to the effect that a
suit could be brought on the debt as evidenced by the judgment.
Recognizing that a debt is merged with the judgment rendered
on the debt, the court held that any further action on the original
debt would be res judicata.3 8
The practical effect of the decision in the Cassiere case is to
render obsolete the provisions of Article 2278 requiring a writ-
ten acknowledgment to interrupt prescription on a judgment. It
34. E.g., West Feliciana R.R. v. Thornton, 12 La. Ann. 736, 68 Am. Dec. 778
(1857) ; Denistoun & Co. v. Payne, 7 La. Ann. 333 (1852) ; Smalley v. His Cred-
itors, 3 La. Ann. 386 (1848) ; Oakey v. Murphy, 1 La. Ann. 372 (1846) ; Abat
v. Buisson, 9 La. 417 (1836).
35. The court in the Bailey case actually went further than was necessary.
Since no acknowledgment was found, the discussion of whether prescription would
have been interrupted had there been an acknowledgment was extraneous to the
decision. Therefore, the language properly could be termed dictum.
36. Fritz Jahncke, Inc. v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 172 La. 704, 135 So. 32
(1931) ; Blanchard v. Smith, 45 So.2d 527 (La. App. 1950) ; McDaniel v. Smith,
13 La. App. 61 (1930).
37. 225 La. 1003, 74 So.2d 193 (1954).
38. The court recognized that a written promise to pay a judgment, whether
given before or after prescription accrues, is enforceable. However, the court made
it clear that "such a promise is valid and enforceable but only because it creates
a new obligation and not because it interrupts the prescription on the original




is the writer's opinion that the result reached in the Cassiere
case is desirable. The provisions for reviving a money judgment
under Article 3547 are clear and uncomplicated. 39 If a judgment
creditor fails to comply with the simple requisites of that article,
surely the judgment debtor should be discharged.
At this point it might prove helpful to note other interesting
problems and principles in connection with the revival of judg-
ments in Louisiana. It is settled that the ten-year prescription
on a money judgment begins to run from its rendition in the low-
er court,40 and that neither a suspensive nor devolutive appeal
works an interruption of this prescription.4 1 The suit for revival
must be brought in the court which rendered the original judg-
ment,42 and the merits of the original action are not at issue in
the revival proceeding. 43 Prescription on a judgment is inter-
rupted by the filing of a suit to revive in a court of competent
jurisdiction. 44 However, this interruption of prescription is not
to be construed as having any effect on the judicial mortgage
which may exist by virtue of the recordation of the original
judgment. 4 5 It has been stated that under the provisions of Ar-
39. The pertinent part of the article provides that "any party interested in
any judgment may have the same revived at any time before it is prescribed, by
having a citation issued according to law, to the defendant or his representative,
from the court which rendered the judgment, unless the defendant or his repre-
sentative show good cause why the judgment should not be revived." LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 3547 (1870).
40. Bailey v. Louisiana & N.W.R.R., 159 La. 575, 105 So. 626 (1925) ; Scott
& Co. v. Seelye, 39 La. Ann. 749, 2 So. 309 (1887) ; Arrowsmith v. Durell, 21 La.
Ann. 295 (1869). Rendition of a judgment in the trial court is the signing thereof
by the judge. Victor v. Heintz, 201 La. 884, 10 So.2d 690 (1942). In case the
money judgment has been rendered for the first time on appeal the prescriptive
period begins to run from the date the appellate court's decision is handed down.
Crusel v. Teirce, 150 La. 893, 91 So. 288 (1922).
41. Bailey v. Louisiana & N.W.R.R., 159 La. 575, 105 So. 626 (1925) ; Mar-
bury v. Pace, 30 La. Ann. 1330 (1878) ; Byrne, Vance & Co. v. Garrett, 23 La.
Ann. 587 (1871) ; Walker v. Succession of Hays, 23 La. Ann. 176 (1871) ; Arrow-
smith v. Durell, 21 La. Ann. 295 (1869).
42. New Orleans Canal & Banking Co. v. Pike, 28 La. Ann. 896 (1876);
Samory v. Montgomery, 27 La. Ann. 50 (1875) ; Watt & Co. v. Hendry, 23 La.
Ann. 594 (1871).
43. Folger & Son v. Slaughter, 33 La. Ann. 341 (1881) ; McStea v. Rotchford,
29 La. Ann. 69 (1877). In Marbury v. Pace, 30 La. Ann. 1330, 1330-31 (1870),
the court stated: "The sole issues therefore that can be tried in a suit to revive
a judgment are whether it had ever been rendered, and whether it had become
extinct. The proof of the former is a certified copy of the judgment itself, and of
the latter an actual payment, or the payment which the law presumes to have
been made from lapse of time, or some other mode of extinguishing it."
44. LA. R.S. 9:5801 (1950). See Blanchard v. Smith, 45 So.2d 521 (La. App.
1950). Service of citation' from an incompetent court also interrupts prescription,
on a money judgment. Levy v. Calhoun, 34 La. Ann. 413 (1882). See LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 3518 (1870) and Comment, 14 TuL. L. REv. 601 (1940).
45. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3321, 3322 (1870).
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ticle 336946 a judicial mortgage must be reinscribed within ten
years of the original inscription.47 Thus, a situation can be en-
visaged where prescription on a judgment may be interrupted
by the filing of suit to revive, but the judicial mortgage would
be lost through failure to reinscribe. Where junior mortgages
are involved the priority of the judicial mortgage would be lost
even though the revived judgment, if recorded, would constitute
a mortgage on the debtor's property.4 8
, Judgments of Another State. Although, as previously stated,
domestic judgments were imprescriptible prior to 1853, judg-
ments obtained outside Louisiana did not enjoy this status. Be-
fore the enactment of legislation dealing with the prescription of
out-of-state judgments it was determined that a suit on a foreign
judgment in Louisiana was a personal action, which prescribed
in ten years under Article 3508 of the Civil Code of 1825.49 Even
at this early date it was made apparent that Louisiana was going
to apply its own prescription to judgments, regardless of the law
of the state where the judgment was rendered.50 By Act 274 of
18531 the Louisiana legislature provided for the prescription
and revival of foreign judgments. This legislation, discussed
above as providing for prescription and revival of domestic judg-
ments, also provided that money judgments obtained outside
Louisiana should be prescribed by the lapse of ten years from
the date of rendition. As in the case of domestic judgments, pro-
vision was made for the revival of money judgments rendered
outside Louisiana.
In 1855 Louisiana enacted its "borrowing statute" which
provides that:
"Whenever any contract or obligation has been entered into,
or judgment rendered, between persons who reside out of
the State of Louisiana, and to be paid or performed out of
this State, and such contract, obligation or judgment is
46. Id. art. 3369.
47. Carrol, Hoy & Co. v. Seip, 25 La. Ann. 141 (1873).
48. See ibid.
49. LA. CIL CODE art. 3508 (1825); Deal v. Patterson, 12 La. Ann. 728
(1857) ; Shackleford v. Robinson, 10 La. Ann. 583 (1855) ; Succession of Tilgh-
man, 7 Rob. 387 (La. 1844). LA. CIVL CODE art. 3508 (1825), now, as amended,
LA. CIVIL CoDE art. 3544 (1870). Under LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 746 (1825),
a judgment obtained in another state could be enforced in Louisiana by executory
process. This provision of the article was repealed by La. Acts 1846, No. 197.
Cf. La. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 746 (1870).
50. Taylor v. Joor, 7 La. Ann. 272 (1852).
51. La. Acts 1853, No. 274.
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barred by prescription or the statute of limitations of the
place where the contract or obligation is to be performed or
judgment executed, the same shall be considered and held as
barred by prescription in Louisiana, upon the debtor who is
thus discharged subsequently coming into this State. 5 2
In order for a judgment which is barred in another state but
otherwise enforceable in Louisiana to fall within the scope of
this article, the following conditions must be present: (1) the
judgment must, in fact, be barred where rendered; 53 (2) the
judgment must have been rendered out-of-state between parties
residing out-of-state ;54 (3) the foreign limitation must have been
completed before the judgment debtor came to Louisiana. 5 This
last requirement was apparently negatived by a 1936 amend-
ment to Article 3547. The amendment provides "except that no
judgment for money rendered without the State shall be enforce-
able in this State if it is prescribed or unenforceable under the
laws of the State wherein it was rendered."56 Although no cases
were found interpreting the amendment, it appears that a for-
eign judgment debtor might avail himself of its provisions even
though the foreign limitation accrued after he became a resi-
dent of this state.
Under the Louisiana jurisprudence it is settled that the pre-
scriptive period of the forum is to be applied in actions on out-of-
state judgments. 7 Since Article 13 of the Louisiana Code of
Practice provides in part that "the prescription of actions, are
governed by the law of the place where they are brought, ' 58 most
of the jurisprudence is based on this article. Such application of
the lex fori is not contrary to the "full faith and credit" clause
52. LA. CrviL CODE art. 3532 (1870), formerly La. Acts 1855, No. 168.
53. Morton v. Valentine, 15 La. Ann. 150 (1860). In this case a Mississippi
court had allowed a judgment to be revived after the lapse of seven years even
though Mississippi law forbade such revival. When a suit was brought in Louisi-
ana on the judgment the court said that to be barred in Louisiana under the "bor-
rowing" statute, the judgment must be completely barred where rendered.
54. Walworth v. Routh, 14 La. Ann. 205 (1859). But see Roper v. Monroe
Grocery Co., 171 La. 181, 129 So. 811 (1930) (the word "between" appearing in
Civil Code Article 3532 was interpreted to mean "against," and the article was
applied even though the plaintiff was a resident of Louisiana).
55. Walworth v. Routh, 14 La. Ann. 205 (1859).
56. La. Acts 1936, No. 278.
57. Roper v. Monroe Grocery Co., 171 La. 181,.129 So. 811 (1930) ; Newman
v. Eldridge, 107 La. 315, 31 So. 688 (1902) ; Succession of Ducker, 10 La. Ann.
758 (1855) ; Taylor v. Joor, 7 La. Ann. 272 (1852) ; Park v. Markley, 17 So.2d
459 (La. App. 1944).
58. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 13 (1870).
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of' the United States Constitution,59 and is in keeping with the
majority Anglo-American common law rule.60 It is arguable that
the-life given a money judgment by the state of rendition should
form an integral part thereof and be given effect in sister states.
However, any such unqualified position would involve consid-
eration of the many ramifications of the substantive-procedural
aspect of statutes of limitation which is beyond the scope of this
paper
The Proposed Code of Civil Procedure
The proposed Code of Civil Procedure, drafted by the Louisi-
ana Law Institute, has made no drastic change with reference
to, revival of judgments. The procedural aspects of Civil. Code
Article 3547, providing for prescription and revival of money
judgments, will be transferred to the procedural code. Thus Ar-
ticle 2031 provides:
*"A money judgment may be revived at any time before it pre-
Sscribes by an interested party in an ordinary proceeding
brought in the court in which the judgment was rendered.
"The judgment debtor shall be made a defendant in the
proceeding to revive the judgment, unless he is dead, in which
event his legal successor shall be made a defendant.
"A judgment shall be rendered in such a proceeding re-
viving the original judgment, unless the defendant shows
good cause why it should not be revived."
6
'
The Redactors' comments following this article indicate that it
is predicated on the assumption that Civil Code Article 3547 will
be given the same interpretation as given in the Cassiere case,
which was discussed above.
'The transfer of the procedural aspects of Article 3547 to the
proposed procedural code will necessitate an amendment to Ar-
ticle 3547 of the Civil Code. In an implementing bill the Law In-
stitute will recommend that this article be amended to provide
that:'
59. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. 312 (1839). For an interesting attempt to
exteod the traditional doctrine that foreign statutes of limitation are procedural
see.Union Nat. Bank v. Lamb, 337 U.S. 38 (1949).
60. STUMBERGO PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 141 (1937); RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 604 (1934).
61. Proposed La. Code of Civil Procedure art. 2031.
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"A money judgment rendered by a court of this state is
prescribed by the lapse of ten years from its signing, if ren-
dered by a trial court, or from its rendition if rendered by an
appellate court.
"An action in a court of this state to enforce a money
judgment rendered by a court of another state, or of a pos-
session of the United States, or of a foreign country is barred
by the lapse of ten years from its rendition; but no such judg-
ment is enforceable in this state if the judgment is pre-
scribed, barred by the statute of limitation, or otherwise un-
enforceable under the laws of the jurisdiction where it was
..rendered.
"Any party having an interest in a money judgment may
have it revived before it prescribes, as provided in Article
2031 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A judgment may be re-
vived as often as the party interested may desire."
The present law will not be changed by the above article. How-
ever a comparison with the present article on the subject will
reveal the clarity effected by the amendment. The amendment
further serves the desirable purpose of eliminating the proce-
dural aspects of Article 3547 from the Civil Code.
Conclusion
It has been noted that the American common law states
found it desirable to modify the early procedures of revival of
judgments under the writ of scire facias and action of debt.
With each state enacting legislation, the law on the subject has
grown in a haphazard manner. It has also been noted that the
French have such a long prescriptive period on judgments that
revival procedure is not necessary in that country. It is suggest-
ed that the Louisiana system providing both a limitation on the
life of a money judgment and an uncomplicated procedure to
revive such a judgment is both practical and workable.
Hugh T. Ward
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